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ABSTRACT
Functional claims have caused many headaches for academics, judges and practitioners who have
struggled to define precisely what constitutes "functional" claim language and to determine the
proper scope afforded to broad means-plus-function claim elements. The debate between academics
and judges regarding functional claim interpretation has typically focused on Congressional intent
behind the statute, specifically whether 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6 was intended solely as a claim
interpretation tool or only as means for narrowing functional claims during an infringement
analysis. The Federal Circuit famously adopted a hybrid approach in In re Donaldson, but since
then several authors have levied serious criticisms of the current framework. For practitioners, the
trigger for evoking the statute has always been somewhat ambiguous and the Federal Circuit's
recent opinion in Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Abacus Software only exacerbates the
confusion. This comment consolidates the critiques of the Federal Circuit's current approach and
proposes that the perceived inequities of the current system can be resolved by adopting a separate
claims prosecution process for functional claims.
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THE CROSSROADS OF PATENTABILITY & VALIDITY:
WHY RESOLVING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT WILL NOT
FIX FUNCTIONAL CLAIMS
Nathaniel V. Riley*

INTRODUCTION

Rudimentary patent law concepts teach us that the claims narrowly define a
patent's breadth, forming the basis of any action for infringement. 1 The claims also
stand alone to determine whether the patent will withstand facial challenges during
prosecution (claim "patentability") or litigation (claim "validity").2 Functional claim
language, however, allows patentees to vaguely approximate the metes and bounds of
their inventions. 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6 ("Paragraph 6"), the statute governing
functional claim language, allows drafters of combination claims to express an
element in a claim as a means or step for performing a specified function without
reciting the structure, material or acts supporting that function. 3 This provision
expressly sanctions broad, functional means or step-plus-function claim language.
Interpreted literally, means and step-plus-function claims would provide expansive
protection for any patentee. 4 Of course, functional claim language, by its very
nature, casts too wide a net, trapping technology and undermining the advancement
6
of the useful arts. 5 Thus, Congress sought to reduce the scope of functional claims
7
by adding the equivalents clause to the statute.
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See ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS 19 (Praeger 2004) (1999).
2 In re Zeltz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (elucidating the different legal standards
applied during patent prosecution and litigation); See gone-rally, Exparte Fressola, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
1608, 1609-10 (B.P.A.I. 1993).
3 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 (2006).
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material
or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, materials or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.
Id. (original version at 35 U.S.C. § 112, 3 (1952)).
4 In _ro Fuetterer, 319 F.2d 259, 262-63 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (citing to then 35 U.S.C. § 112, 3, the
court notes the Patent Act now "specifically authorizes" the use of functional language in patent
claims). See also O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853).
5 See gonerally OReily, 56 U.S. at 120 (criticizing functional claim writing for its overbreadth); Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that
if a functional claim were read literally it could encompass "every conceivable means for performing
the function" and holding that the equivalents clause should thus be used to limit such claims to
their specifications); 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.04 (2006) (discussing that
functional claim writing is not preferred because it (1) allows the patentee to claim something
beyond what she has invented and (2) defines the invention in a vague and ambiguous manner thus
providing little notice to the rest of the world as to what claim covers precisely).
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The Federal Circuit's jurisprudence restricts the use of functional claim
language by limiting what equivalents are covered 8 and rarely finds claims in stepplus-function format. 9 Beginning from the widely accepted supposition that the
scope of functional claims must be narrowed, this comment addresses an ongoing
debate within the literature and the Federal Circuit: whether Congress intended the
equivalents clause to be applied during (1) claim patentability and validity
challenges or (2) a separate infringement analysis. 10 In either case, the Federal
Circuit's adoption of a hybrid approach11 has led it to misuse the equivalents clause
with grievous consequences for owners of patents containing functional elements.
Irrespective of when the equivalents clause is applied during litigation, many
inconsistencies will subsist in the current framework for narrowing functional claims
and separation of the equivalents analysis will not solve every problem without
further action.
In Part I this comment details the historical underpinnings of Paragraph 6 and
discusses how the Federal Circuit determines when the patentee sought to evoke
means or step-plus-function treatment. Part II examines the Federal Circuit's
conflicting standards of review and conflicting statements of congressional intent
behind Paragraph 6. Part II also elucidates the disparity between the doctrine of
equivalents and Paragraph 6's equivalents clause and criticizes the Federal Circuit's
current framework as violating a patentee's Seventh Amendment rights, as
articulated by the Supreme Court in Markman.12 Part III proposes Congress and the
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") recalibrate the existing framework by (a)
amending the statute to clarify Congress's intent behind Paragraph 6 and (b)
creating a separate prosecution process for functional claims.

6 In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Chiuminatta Concrete
Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (using the equivalents
clause of 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6 to articulate the after-developed technology doctrine, limiting the
scope of functional patent claims).
7 Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Conl17eting Theories ofEquivaleneo: 35 US C § 112, 6 in the Sup-reme
Court and the FederalCircuit,40 IDEA 163, 166 (2000) (referring to the final clause of 35 U.S.C. §
112,
6 as the "equivalents clause"); 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6 (2006) ('[A]nd such claim shall be
construed to cover the corresponding structure, materials or acts described in the specifications and
equivalents thereof.").
8 Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1310 (articulating the after-developed technology doctrine, which
limits the scope of functional patent claims to those technologies described in the specifications and
providing protection from non-disclosed technologies only if they were developed after the patent
was issued).
9 See generally 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (cautioning
against the use of functional claim language); Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 172
F.3d 836, 851 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Rader, J., concurring); Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316,
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (construing "or step" in 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6 very narrowly, nearly to the point
of reading step -plus-function claims out of existence).
10 See generally 3 MARTIN J. ADELMAN, PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES § 2.9[5] n.84 (2007)
(criticizing In re Donaldson).
11In -re Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1193 (holding Paragraph 6 should be applied during both
litigation and claim interpretation before courts or the PTO).
12Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370
(1996).
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I. ANATOMY OF A FUNCTIONAL CLAIM: THE JURISPRUDENCE & HISTORY
OF 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6

The Supreme Court's 1946 decision in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v.
Walker 13 marked the nadir for functional claim language. 14 In Halliburton, the
patentee successfully sued for infringement of his patent for a device used in
measuring oil well distances. 15 On appeal, the Supreme Court held the plaintiffs
claim language functional1 6 and went on to state that where the invention claims a
combination, the patentee must explicitly describe the new combination of old
devices.17 The Court held the patent's "blanket claims" were invalid because they
were functional at the "point of novelty."18 The Court insisted that upholding such
claim language would undermine patent's public notice function and thereby chill
innovation. 19 Halliburton unequivocally ended functional claim language until
Congress resurrected it in the 1952 Patent Act. 20 In Part I (A), this comment
examines the historical and legal underpinnings of Paragraph 6 and summarizes the
Federal Circuit's understanding of Congress's intent behind the statute. Part I (B)
discusses the modern "intent to evoke" standard developed by the Federal Circuit
that determines when the patentee sought to evoke means or step-plus-function
treatment, i.e. the Federal Circuit's test for determining what constitutes
"functional" claim language.

A. Statutorily OverrulingHalliburton
Six years after the Supreme Court's decision in Halliburton,Congress enacted
the 1952 Patent Act which added then Paragraph 3, currently Paragraph 6, expressly
sanctioning functional claim language. 21 This provision is widely accepted as the

13 329 U.S. 1 (1946).
14 fd. at 14; see generally William F. Lee & Eugene M. Paige, Means Plus and Step Plus
Function Claims.*Do We Only Know Them When We See Them, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOc'Y 251, 253-54 (1998) (discussing the impact of the Halliburton decision as a precursor to
Congress's enactment of then 35 USC § 112, 3).
15Halliburton,329 U.S. at 2, 7-8.
16Id.at 9 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938), for the
then well known proposition that patent claims employing conveniently functional language at the
exact point of novelty are invalid because they claim the function (what the invention achieves) and
fail to describe its physical components (how it operates)).
17Id. at 11.
18Id. at 12 (recognizing the Halliburton device achieves the same function as plaintiffs patent,
rather than claiming the structure of the new combination, the claim used functional terms
describing what the new device accomplished, e.g. removing background noise by employing an
'electric filter"). See also Wabash Alliance Corp., 304 U.S. at 371 (coining the phrase "functional...
at the exact point of novelty"); Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 217 F. 775, 782
(6th Cir. 1914).
19Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 10 (acknowledging functional claim language provides little notice
to competitors and licensees of precisely what the patentee has created and monopolized).
20 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27-28 (1996).
21 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 (2006) (original version at 35 U.S.C. § 112, 3 (1952)).
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congressional response to the Supreme Court's opinion in Hallburton.22 The federal
judiciary has cited PJ Federico's commentary on the Patent Act, written while he was
U.S. Patent Office Examiner-in-Chief, as an authoritative source for unveiling
congressional intent. 23 In that commentary, Mr. Federico found it "unquestionable"
that the "use of functional expressions in combination claims is authorized" 24 and
further remarked that the new Patent Act rendered Halliburton obsolete. 25 Ever
since then, however, the Federal Circuit has struggled to define the precise
boundaries of functional claims.

26

From 1952-1994 the PTO resisted granting patents with broad, functional
language. 27 In an early case, In re Fuetterer,28 a patent applicant appealed the
decision of the PTO to deny his application seeking to patent a new tire tread
combination improving traction under wet conditions. 29 The patent claimed that by
adding an effective amount of inorganic salt combined with other ingredients, the tire
tread gained better traction. 30
The PTO denied his claim as "indefinite and
ambiguous" because it listed only four inorganic salts when there existed thousands
31
of other salts capable of producing similar or better results.
On review, the court held the 1952 Patent Act specifically authorized a more
liberal use of functional claims than had previously been permitted by some stricter
22 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 27-28 ("Congress enacted § 112,
6 in response to
Halliburtoi');see also Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
In place of the Halliburton rule, Congress adopted a compromise solution, one that had support in
the pre-Halliburtoncase law: Congress permitted the use of purely functional language in claims,
but it limited the breadth of such claim language by restricting its scope to the structure disclosed in
the specification and equivalents thereof. Id.; In -r Fuetterer, 319 F.2d 259, 264 n.ll (C.C.P.A.
1964) (stating that the case law before Halliburton permitted claims involving "means,' plus a
statement of function" and quoting Rep. Joseph R. Bryson (D-SC) who chaired the sub-committee "in
charge of the .. .Patent Act" and stated, '[§ 112,
3] will [permit] combination claiming as it was
understood before the Halliburton decision").
23 P.J. Federico, Commentaryon the NewPatentAct, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 161,
186 (1993). See also Symbol Tech., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
("Federico's commentary is an invaluable insight into the intentions of the drafters of the Act.").
24 Federico, supra note 23, at 186.
25 Id.
(insisting that the new paragraph "modified or rendered obsolete" the
alliburton
decision). See also Charles J. Zinn, Commentary on New Title 35, US. Code "Patents'"1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2507, 2514 (1952) (noting that the new paragraph recognizes the validity of
combination claims where the novelty is expressed in functional terms in order to offset the
Halliburtoncase).
26 See generally Lee & Paige, supra note 14, at 252 (characterizing the Federal Circuit's
jurisprudence regarding means and step-plus-function claim as "fraught with uncertainty" and
stating interpretation of the statute is only beginning to gain clarity).
27 See generally In re Fuetterer, 319 F.2d 259, 264 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (rejecting the argument of
the Patent Office Solicitor that the "third paragraph of 35 USC § 112 (now paragraph 6) is
necessarily 'in derogation of the previous case law' and therefore 'must be strictly construed'); In re
Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1192-93 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (reversing the PTO's forty-two year long
policy of not reading the specifications into claims when interpreting a means or step-plus-function
claim).
28 319 F.2d 259.
29 Id. at 260.
30 Id. at 265 C'[Applicant regards as his invention' the combination with his other tread
ingredients of any inorganic salt capable of 'maintaining the carbohydrate, the protein, or mixture
thereof, in colloidal suspension.").

31 Id. at 262.
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court decisions (e.g. Hallihburton).32 Thus, Mr. Fuetterer's functional claims were
patentable despite the thousands of other likely potent salts the application failed to
list. 33 According to the court, requiring such an exhaustive list, where the patent act
34
clearly allowed functional language, would place an undue burden on the patentee.
The court cautioned, however, that holding the claims patentable did not mean the
patent would protect the patentee from an alleged infringer who simply used one of
35
the unlisted inorganic salts.
Despite this holding, it was not until 1994, after being chastised by the Federal
Circuit, 36 that the PTO began looking beyond the claims and at the specifications to

determine patentability. 37 The court held this approach was more in line with
Congress's dual intent behind the statute. 38 Thus, the two decisions cleared the
mounting tension between the PTO and the Federal Circuit regarding functional
claims and expressly sanctioned their use, opening the floodgates of litigation
regarding functional claims.

39

B. FindingMeans and Step -Plus-FunctionClaims:Moving A way
from Judge Rader's Bright-Line

Modern means and step-plus-function analysis attempts to determine when the
patentee's claim language evokes the statute, i.e., what constitutes "functional"
language. 40 There are no "magic words" which will consistently invoke means-plusfunction treatment. 41 Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit, however, remains the most

32

Id. ("Title 35, U.S.C.... specifically authorizes [functional claim language].").

3

Id. at 265.

Id. at 265-66.
Id. If others in the future discover what inorganic salts additional to those enumerated do
have such properties, it is clear appellant will have no control over them per se, and equally clear
his claims should not be so restricted that they can be avoided merely by using some inorganic salt
not named by appellant in his disclosure. Id.
36 Jn re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rebuking the PTO Board's policy of
neglecting to read the specifications into the claims for means-plus-function applications, thereby
denying functional language claims that would otherwise be patentable).
37 1162 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE OFFICIAL GAZETTE 59 (May 17, 1994) (responding to In
re Donaldson with new guidelines for interpreting means and step-plus-function claims under
Paragraph 6).
38 In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1193-94 & nn.3-4 (holding PTO's policy undermined Congress's
intent to simultaneously sanction functional claims yet restrict their scope-"paragraph six applies
regardless of the context in which the interpretation of means-plus-function language arises, i.e.,
whether as part of a patentability determination by the PTO or as part of a validity or infringement
determination in a court").
39 Kevin R. Casey, Means Plus Function Claims After Markman: Is Claim Construction Under
35 USC. § 112, f 6A Question of Fact or an Issue of Law, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
841, 862-64 (1997) (noting the tension between the PTO and Federal Circuit regarding functional
claim language).
40 Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
41 Lee & Paige, supra note 14, at 267 (noting while use of the word "means" in a claim will get
you closer "than anything else" to evoking 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6, however use of the word is not
definitive); Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting the
PTO has "rejected the argument that only the term 'means' will evoke section 112(6)" but ultimately
'3
3

[7:218 2007]

The Crossroads of Patentability & Validity

outspoken advocate of adopting a bright-line rule whereby use of "means" or "steps
for" gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the patentee intended to evoke
Paragraph

6.42

1. Means-Plus-FunetionAnalysis
While the Federal Circuit derogates from finding a single claim in step-plusfunction format and rarely reviews such claims 43 the court frequently adjudicates
means-plus-function claims. 44 Judge Rader's opinion in Sage Productions, Inc. v.

Devon Industries,Inc. 45 espouses a bright-line rule: use of the term "means for X,"
where X is the recital of some function, gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that
the patentee intended to evoke the statute if the claim fails to specify the underlying
structure, materials or acts supporting that function. 46 For example, in a claim for a
clothes washer, the patentee evokes the statute by claiming "means for washing
clothes" without providing any details regarding the structure of the machine (i.e. the
tub, lid, gearbox, plumbing system, etc.) or how the machine combines detergent with
47
water to clean the clothes.

holding "it is fair to say that use of the term 'means' . . . generally invokes section 112(6) and that
the use of a different formulation generally does not.").
42 Lee & Paige, supra note 14, at 267; Sage, 126 F.3d at 1427-28 (noting "use of the word
'means,"' is part of the "classic template for functional claim elements" giving rise to "a presumption
that the inventor used the term advisedly to evoke" the statute); Cole v. Kimberly Clark, 102 F.3d
524, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Rader, J., dissenting); Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr.,
172 F.3d 836, 850 (Rader, J., concurring) (asserting "step for" in step-plus-function claims raises the
same rebuttable presumption that "means" raises in means-plus-function claims).
43 CHISUM, supra note 5, § 18.03(5)(e)(iii) ("T]here were virtually no court decisions addressing
,step' clauses until the late 1990's."); Lee & Paige, supra note 14, 267 (recognizing that there is
"uncertainty about what a 'step-plus-function' claim actually looks like" and suggesting that the
dilemma may continue into the foreseeable future since "very few claims have been drafted in this
manner"); Seal-Flex, 172 F.3d at 850 n.5 (Rader, J., concurring) (citing to the only two pre-Federal
Circuit opinions interpreting step -plus -function claims).
44 Chisum, supra note 5, § 18.03(5)(e)(iii). In the first four decades under the new patent act
appellate courts decided few cases implicating 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6 (previously
3), however, since
the 1990's the court has decided several cases involving means-plus-function claims. Id.
4, 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
46 Id. at 1427; see also Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co., 906 F. Supp. 798, 808 (E.D.N.Y.
1995). Sitting by designation as a district court judge, Judge Rader, citing several cases interpreting
claims using the term "means" in means-plus-function, lamented "the recitation of some structure
does not remove a claim from the ambit of section 112." Id.
47 Example provided by author for illustrative purposes. The patentee would then describe the
underlying structure, materials or acts in the corresponding specifications, as called for in the
statute. 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6. The more typical example given of a means-plus-function claim is "a
means for fastening" where any screw, nail or adhesive could work. MARTIN J. ADELMAN, ET. AL,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 556 (2d ed. 2003). However, as the analysis below indicates,
use of functional language at the point of novelty is much more problematic than using it to describe
minor or insubstantial elements of a claim, such as fastening. See, e.g., Valmont Indus., Inc. v.
Reinke Mfg., Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Cross Med. Prod., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor
Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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Over the last decade, this "intent to evoke" test has become a major component
of the Federal Circuit's analysis regarding means-plus-function claims.48

Under

Judge Rader's analysis, once a litigant establishes the presence of functional claim
language, the burden shifts to the patentee to rebut the presumption that she
intended, to evoke the statute by advisedly using terms known to be functional in
nature. 49 The Federal Circuit, however, has been very careful not to adopt Judge
Rader's approach wholesale. 50 Instead the court has returned to pre-Sage reasoning
and declared that means-plus-function claims may exist without the patentee using
specific claim language (e.g. "means for X").51 Despite numerous Federal Circuit
opinions interpreting means-plus-function claims, the court still fails to adequately
illuminate the dark boundaries of functional claim language. 52 Instead, the Federal
Circuit's framework attempts to synthesize Judge Rader's intent-based presumption
with a more paternal approach whereby any claim language that lacks "sufficient
structure" can invoke the statute, irrespective of whether the claim drafter knew she
53
was using functional language.

2. Step -Plus-Funetion
Commentators are apt to point out that the law regarding step-plus-function
remains significantly undeveloped. 54 Since its inception in 1982, the Federal Circuit

48 Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Tech. Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Altiris, Inc. v.
Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (adhering to Judge Rader's bright-line rule
that specific claim language gives rise to a presumption of intent to evoke Paragraph 6).
49 York Prods., Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(noting "the word 'means' triggers a presumption" but ultimately holding the presumption was
rebutted by the claim's recital of structure).
50 Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (digressing
from Judge Rader's intent based formula and ruling even claim language without "means" may
nevertheless receive means-plus-function treatment where the claim term fails to recite "sufficiently
definite structure" or recites "function without... structure for performing that function").
51Id. ("[G]eneric terms 'mechanism,' 'means,' 'element,' and 'device,' typically do not connote
sufficiently definite structure."); Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(noting use of the word "means" is not dispositive for or against means-plus-function treatment); see
also Lee & Paige, supra note 14, at 267 (discussing that Judge Rader's presumption is not
dispositive).
52 Jeffrey N. Costakos & Walter E. Zimmerman, Do Your Means Claims Mean What You
Meant, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 109, 111-15 (1997) (discussing the limited use of meansplus-function claiming among patent practitioners following several Federal Circuit decisions that
limited the protection afforded means-plus-function claims); 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON
PATENTS § 4:90 (2006) (criticizing the law of means-plus-function claims as "poor" and
unpredictable).
53

See Mass. Inst. of Tech, 462 F.3d at 1353.

51Durham, supra note 1, at 64-65 (noting that courts seldom apply step-plus-function
limitations to claims and proposing that the "problematic language" giving rise to step-plus-function
claims should simply be repealed); Lee & Paige, supra note 14, at 267. The Federal Circuit also
notes that, due to a lack of jurisprudence on such claims, construing the claim in step-plus-function
format would upset the patentees investment backed expectations or "render the scope of the
coverage of these method claims uncertain and disrupt the patentees' settled expectations.
Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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has yet to find a claim written in step-plus-function form. 55 The limited case law on
step-plus-function resolves little: the Federal Circuit suggests it will construe a claim
in step-plus-function format only when the claim drafter signals his intent to invoke
Paragraph 6 by using "steps for" language but not "steps of'56 and then only when
"steps plus function without acts are present." 57 Furthermore, the court consistently
refuses to apply the statute to common method claims, finding claims using "steps of'
and gerunds such as "passing, heating, reacting, transferring" are not in step-plusfunction. 58 Again, the Federal Circuit's application of Paragraph 6 is guided by their
understanding that Congress's limited purpose was to overrule Halliburton,59 thus
leading the court to suggest both means and step-plus-function claims should
undergo roughly the same analysis. 60 The only guidance of any substance from the
Federal Circuit comes from Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Construetion
and 0.1 Corp. v. Tekmar Co. where Judge Rader has modeled step-plus-function
61
analysis on the means-plus-function "intent to evoke" formula.
5 See generally Cardiac Pacemakers Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc. (Cardiac Pacemakers Il), 381
F.3d 1371, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding use of "steps of' in a claim preamble was not in stepplus
function form); Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1327 (reversing decision that "transmitting a force" was in
step-plus-function form); Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, 279 F.3d 1022, 1028 (Fed. Cir.
2002); Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (claim language using "step"
was not functional and therefore could not fall within the ambit of Paragraph 6). However, there are
two pre-Federal Circuit opinions finding claims in step-plus-function form. Ex Parte Zimmerly &
Beck, 153 U.S.P.Q. 367, 369 (B.P.A.I. 1966) (interpreting "raising the pH" in step -plus -function form
and stating the patent act "sanctions functionally defined steps in claims drawn to a combination of
steps"); In re Roberts, 470 F.2d 1399, 1402 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (holding use of functional language does
not "in and of itself' render a claim invalid).
56 Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1327 (adjudicating a claim involving "steps of' language the court
held "we are unwilling to resort to [Paragraph 6] ... without a showing that the limitation contains
nothingthat can be construed as an act.") (emphasis added); 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co. Inc., 115 F.3d
1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that the statement in a claim's preamble describing its overall
process, combined with claim language calling for "steps of," is not enough to evoke Paragraph 6);
Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Utica Enters.,
Inc., v. Fed. Broach & Mach. Co., 109 F. App'x 403, 409 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
57 Tekmar, 115 F.3d at 1582-84 (stating that any mention of the word "step" in the claim
preamble is essentially meaningless for Paragraph 6 purposes); CardiacPacomakors -I, 381 F.3d at
1381 (reaffirming Tekmar holding a preamble recitation of "steps of' does not create a Paragraph 6
presumption, only "step [s] for" language does).
5S Tekmar, 115 F.3d at 1583. [W]e must be careful not to extend the language of this provision
to situations not contemplated by Congress. If we were to construe every process claim containing
steps described by an "ing" verb, such as passing, heating, reacting, transferring, etc. into a stepplus-function limitation, we would be limiting process claims in a manner never intended by
Congress. Id.
5 Id. See also Masco, 303 F.3d at 1326 (citing Federico's commentary, the court held "steps
for" in a step-plus-function claim gives rise to the same presumption as "means" in the means-plus
function context).
6o Tekmar, 115 F.3d at 1583 (stating that means and step-plus-function claims undergo the
same analysis, "structure and materials go with means, acts go with steps ... only when means plus
function without definite structure are present, and that is similarly true with respect to steps, that
the paragraph is implicated only when steps plus function without acts are present.") (emphasis in
original).
1 Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Const., 172 F.3d 836, 848 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Rader,
J., concurring) (analogizing the means-plus-function test to step-plus-function analysis, "[g]iven the
parallel format of the statute, a similar analysis applies to step-plus-function claim elements.");
Tekmar, 115 F.3d at 1583.
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Judge Rader's concurrence in Seal-Flex attempts to create a bright-line rule
whereby claim drafters mark their intent to evoke Paragraph 6 by advisedly
implementing specific claim language. 62 Using his opinion in Sage as a guide, Judge
Rader elucidates an intent to evoke test whereby the presence of specific functional
claim language gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of intent to evoke the
statute. 63 This test removes any ambiguity from the statute by defining "functional"
language as any claim employing "steps for X." The patentee can rebut the
presumption that Paragraph 6 was knowingly evoked by showing that the claim
64
states sufficient acts, in support of the steps, to define the invention.
Judge Rader, no doubt mindful of his brethren's recalcitrance to adopt a clear
bright-line rule, continues stating a step-plus-function claim may exist, without
"steps for language," if the patentee claims the underlying function (what the
element accomplishes) without reciting acts (how those functions are accomplished)
for performing the function. 65 This led the court to distinguish "acts" from
"functions" making it nearly impossible to know exactly when a drafter intends to
evoke the statute. 66 Thus a claim, absent the signaling "steps for" language, could
nevertheless be construed in step-plus-function format if the claim has broad
functional language describing what the element does without describing how those
steps are achieved. 67 This final qualification makes the definition of "functional
language" ambiguous, and leaves one wondering when, if ever, a step-plus-function
claim arises. The Federal Circuit offers little guidance, issuing a perfunctory judicial
catch-all, reminding litigants that a step-plus-function claim requires "careful
68
analysis."

C. Seventh Amendment Considerations
Applying the intent to evoke test in the abstract (e.g. during claim prosecution)
is much less complicated than in litigation where the constitutional imperative
requiring separation of legal and factual issues compounds the difficulty. The

62 Seal-Flex, 172

F.3d at 848-50; see also Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Seal-Flex, 172 F.3d at 849 (noting the phrase "steps for" marks the patentee's intent to evoke
paragraph six, "the phrase 'step for' in a method claim raises a presumption that § 112,
6
applies.").
(4 Id.
63

( Id. at 849-50. Several courts have reaffirmed the holding in Seal-Flex. See, e.g., Maseo
Corp., 303 F.3d at 1327; Epcon Gas Sys. Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1028 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (citing to Judge Rader's concurring opinion in Seal-Flex,the court concluded that the lack
of the words "step for" and the recital of "a series of steps without the recital function" does not bring
a method claim within the ambit of Paragraph 6); Utica Enters., Inc. v. Fed. Broach & Mach. Co.,
109 F. App'x 403, 409 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing the rule that absent "steps for" language, a claim is
subject to Paragraph 6 "only if it recites steps for performing a specified function but does not recite
any act in support of that function").
I(Seal Flex, 172 F.3d 836, 849-50 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Rader, J., concurring); see also Masco, 303
F.3d at 1327 (noting construing method claims as step-plus-function limitations would unsettle
inventors expectations).
(7 Seal-Flex,
(3

172 F.3d at 849-50.
Id. at 849 (reminding litigants and lower courts to employ a "careful analysis" of the claim

element in the context of the overall claim and the patent's specifications).
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Supreme Court's landmark decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,6 9
elucidated the relative positions of judges and juries in patent litigation. 7° In typical
patent cases involving non-functional claims, courts construe the claims to determine
patent validity and juries decide infringement. 71 Judges are thus instructed to
bifurcate the proceedings into two separate phases: claim construction, where judges
interpret the claims as a matter of law; and infringement, where fact finders, mindful
of the judge's claim construction, resolve factual issues of equivalence and
infringement.72 Litigation involving functional claims, however, remains somewhat
amorphous.
Before the Supreme Court's opinion in Markman, the Federal Circuit handed
down In re Donaldson Co.73 where the court applied Paragraph 6 to (1) patentability
decisions before the PTO, (2) validity decisions in courts, and (3) infringement
decisions. 74 In re Donaldson marked the first time the court applied Paragraph 6 to
validity decisions and was also a resounding mandate to the PTO, ordering it to use
Paragraph 6 during claim prosecution. 75 In retrospect, In re Donaldson seems at
least somewhat inconsistent with Markman; the former permits judges to apply
Paragraph 6 to both legal and factual issues, while the later explicitly bifurcates the
process into legal and factual inquiries. 76 In re Donaldson instructed lower courts,
adjudicating claims involving functional elements, to look to the specifications twice:
once to determine the patent's validity and again to determine whether the accused
device infringed. 77 This seemingly benign ruling profoundly impacts a litigant's
Seventh Amendment rights, further blurring the line between issues of law and
fact. 78

(3 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
70 fd.at 391.
71Id.at 384-85 (squarely addressing the relative positions of judges and juries in patent cases,
the Supreme Court held there are "two elements of a simple patent case, construing the patent and
determining whether infringement occurred . .
'The first is a question of law .... The second is a

question of fact, to be submitted to a jury."').
72 Id.

7316 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
71Id.at 1193-94 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
75Id. at 1194-95; 1162 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE OFFICIAL GAZETTE 59 (May 17, 1994)

(criticizing the Federal Circuit's decision in In re Donaldson but recognizing that it mandated a new
examining procedure despite the well known policy the PTO had followed "for at least the last fortytwo years"). See alsoADELMAN, supra note 10, § 2.9[5] n.84.

76 Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 183-84 (criticizing the Federal Circuit's theory of functional
claiming as blurring the line between factual and legal issues).
77In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1193; see also Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 178.
78 Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 183-84; see also Casey, supra note 39, at 865 ("[A]lthough
expressly an 'open' issue, claim construction under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6 should be characterized as
an issue of law."). Cf Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1473-75 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(Rader, J., dissenting); ADELMAN, supra note 10, § 2.9[5] n.58 (criticizing In re Donaldson on other
grounds).
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D. After-Developed Technology Doctrine
Once claim construction has closed and the court decides to construe a claim
element in means or step-plus-function format, 79 the court proceeds to trial to
determine infringement, unless the case is disposed on summary judgment. In a case
involving non-functional terms, the court proceeds to trial where the fact finder
determines whether the claim is literally infringed.80 Alternatively, the court may
apply the doctrine of equivalents to determine whether the accused device
81
infringes.
The Federal Circuit has expressly distinguished the doctrine of equivalents from
means-plus function equivalents under Paragraph 6.82
Cases have held the
equivalents clause is neither an equitable doctrine8 3 nor was it an attempt by
Congress to codify the doctrine of equivalents8 4 and that both have different origins
79See generallyApplied Med. Res., Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2006) ("Claim construction of a means-plus-function limitation includes two steps. First, the court
must determine the claimed function. Second, the court must identify the corresponding structure
in the written description of the patent that performs that function.") (internal citations omitted).
80 Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co., Inc., 205 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating the test
for literal infringement).
SI WarnerJenkinson, Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 38 (1997) (suggesting, in
dicta, that the doctrine of equivalents is an issue of fact). The court reaffirmed its adherence to the
doctrine of equivalents and rejected defendant's argument that Paragraph 6 was Congress's implicit
rejection of the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 27. The court applied the function-way-result test to
determine whether the alleged infringing device incorporates an insubstantial difference but
preserves the same function so that the two products "do the same work in substantially the same
way, and accomplish substantially the same result." Id. at 35. See also CHISUM, supra note 5, §
18.03(5)(a) (explaining that if functional claims were interpreted literally, they would be afforded
expansive, unduly broad protection and patentee's would thus cast a net so wide, nearly nothing
would escape it); Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg., Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(noting if functional claims were read literally they "could encompass any conceivable means for
performing the function").
82 Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310-11 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (noting while both doctrines seek to prevent pirating by making insubstantial changes,
the doctrines "are not coextensive" because, unlike the doctrine of equivalents, § 112 6 equivalence
requires "identical, not equivalent function" and only protects the patentee from later developed
technology); see also Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Co., 185 F.3d 1259, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating
means-plus-function limitations must have functional identity with an accused infringer's claim for
both literal and non-literal infringement); Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Weatherford
Int'l Inc., 389 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (same); D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.3d 1570,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Thus the word 'equivalent' in § 112 should not be confused, as it apparently
was here, with the 'doctrine of equivalents."'); Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms Inc. 140 F.3d 1009,
1016-18 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding, after a jury found infringement, the defendant's motion for
judgment as a matter of law should have been granted because of the difference in equivalents
standards); Nomos Corp. v. Brainlab USA, Inc., 357 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (following
Chiuminatta and recognizing the difference in the two equivalents standards).
83 Valmont Indus., 983 F.2d at 1043 (stating that, unlike the doctrine of equivalents, the
equivalents clause is not an equitable doctrine and holding that only the doctrine of equivalents
"equitably expands exclusive patent rights"); see also Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 185 (noting the
Federal Circuit's opinion in Warner-Jnkinson,which ruled the doctrine of equivalents was a factual
inquiry for the jury and thus, a fortiori,not an equitable doctrine).
84 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997) (stating, in dicta,
the equivalents clause may be used to narrow broad claim elements, and that it may be Congress's
approval of the reverse doctrine of equivalents for claim interpretation, but that the clause

[7:218 2007]

The Crossroads of Patentability & Validity

and purposes.8 5 The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that, under the equivalents
clause, a means-plus-function claim's corresponding specifications8 6 limit the
protection afforded to its claims, unlike non-functional claims, which enjoy a wider
scope of protection.8 7 Although there has never been an analogous ruling for stepplus-function claims, the Federal Circuit's analysis indicates that a step-plusfunction claim would be similarly restricted.8 8 This leads commentators to aptly
point out that while using functional language may be easier, or even impossible to
avoid in some cases, it is far from desirable considering the ramifications it has on
the patent's scope, particularly after the Federal Circuit's decision in Chiuminatta
89
Conerete Coneepts v. CardinalIndustries,Ine.
In Chiuminatta, the Federal Circuit limited the scope of protection afforded to
functional claims. 90 The court espoused the after-developed technology doctrine for
means and step-plus-function claims whereby such claims are only protected against
those technologies explicitly listed in the specifications or developed after the date of

ultimately has no bearing on literal infringement); Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural
Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing to In re Donaldson and stating Congress did
not intend to codify the reverse doctrine of equivalents into Paragraph 6).
85 Valmont Indus., 983 F.2d at 1043-44 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that it is important to
distinguish the equivalents clause of Paragraph 6 and the doctrine of equivalents because each has
"separate origins and purposes"), Ky. Farms, 140 F.3d at 1022 (Newman, J., additional views)
(stating that the difference between the two has "long been understood by practitioners of patent
law").
lw Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med. Inc. (CardiacPacemakers 1), 296 F.3d 1106, 1113
(Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[T]he specification must clearly associate the structure with performance of the
function" such that one skilled in the art can see a link between the function listed in the claim and
the "corresponding" function described in the specification).
87 See D.M., 755 F.2d at 1575 (articulating the rule for means-plus-function claims-"the sole
question is whether the single means in the accused device which performs the function stated in
the claim is the same as or an equivalent of the corresponding structure described in the patentee's
specification as performing that function"); Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214,
1221-22 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1310-11 (requiring patentees claiming
functional elements to list existing technologies, unlike non-functional patentees); Ky. Farms, 140
F.3d at 1023 (Michel, J., additional views) (noting means-plus-function claims are only entitled to

protection from "structural equivalents" of those elements found in the specifications; therefore, the
specifications determine the scope of a means-plus-function claim); Greenberg v. Ethicon EndoSurgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 180, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that when Congress allowed for functional
claiming by enacting 35 U.S.C. § 112,
3 they did so with the proviso that such broad claims would
be constrained by their specifications).
88 Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Const., 172 F.3d 836, 850 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Rader,
J., concurring). In sum, similar to means-plus-function claims, this court employs a straightforward
analysis for identifying a step-plus-function claim .... Because the phrasing "step for" would appear
to claim every possible act for performing the recited function, in keeping with § 112,
6, such a
claim covers only the specific acts recited in the specification for performing that function, and
equivalent acts. Id.
89 145 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
See, e.g., Lee & Paige, supra note 14, at 252
(patentee's may "prefer these claims when a patent is being drafted" because of their ease of use but
"may well prefer to be rid of these claims during litigation .. "); 2 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III,
DONALD C. REILEY III & ROBERT C. HIGHLEY, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 14:36 nn.1 & 65-69

(2007) (advising practitioners that functional expressions can be helpful in "overcoming the absence
of the existence of just the right word" but later warning that such claims will be narrowly
construed).
90 Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1311.
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the patent application. 91 Any technologies that pre-date the patent's issue date must
be disclosed in the specifications in order for the patent to receive protection from
infringing devices that serve the same function, but simply accomplish it with
equivalent material, structure or acts. 92 Thus, patentees of functional claims must
compose exhaustive lists of comparable technologies and include these lists in their
specifications in order to successfully argue for literal infringement. 93 Any unlisted
technology will not infringe. 94
Furthermore, the doctrine is applied as the
alternative to literal infringement, foreclosing the patentee from arguing
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and forcing her to rely on literal
infringement of those technologies disclosed in the specifications. 95 The analysis of
infringement under Paragraph 6 also differs in an important, yet easily over-looked,
way: timing. Unlike their nonfunctional counterparts, 96 functional claim elements
97
must have been understood to be equivalent at the time of issuance.

II. HOUSE OF CARDS: INCONSISTENCIES WITHIN THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK
The Federal Circuit's current hybrid analysis of applying the equivalents clause
during facial challenges and infringement (1) blurs the line between factual and legal
issues, which confuses the standard of review and (2) narrows the patent's scope
whenever functional language is employed. Additionally, the court's reluctance to
embrace Judge Rader's bright-line presumption erects several prohibitive barriers to
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1310-11. Soo also AlrSite Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1321 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (citing favorably to Chiuminatta and elucidating the after-developed technology doctrine). Cf
Cross Med. Prod., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(limiting Chiuminatta but also stating the patentee's "failure to explicitly recognize set screws as a
means for securing" suggests the jury could find for the accused infringer on remand).
93Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int'l Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting, in
dicta, that Chiuminatta precludes application of the doctrine of equivalents where the alleged
infringing product involves technology that was known to the patentee at the time of the application
but went undisclosed in his specifications).
94 Chiuminntt, 145 F.3d at 1311 ("There is no policy-based reason why a patentee should get
two bites at the apple. If he or she could have included in the patent what is now alleged to be
equivalent, and did not.., why should the issue of equivalence have to be litigated a second time?");
Furnace Brook, LLC v. Overstock.com, Inc., 230 F. App'x 984, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (applying
Chiuminattds later-developed technology doctrine). But see Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg.,
Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (recognizing that even functional claims are protected
against those changes which add "nothing of significance to the structure, material or acts disclosed
in the patent specification"); Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214, 1222 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (noting that functional claims are protected against insubstantial changes).
95 Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1310; AlSito Corp., 174 F.3d at 1321 n.2; see also Frank's Casing
Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Weatherford Int'l Inc., 389 F.3d 1370, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing
Chiuminatta and holding non-infringement as a matter of law where the accused technology was
known to the patentee yet went undisclosed in his specification); Bateman v. Por-Ta Target, Inc.,
155 F. App'x 511, 516-17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding of non-literal infringement precluded finding of
infringement under doctrine of equivalents).
96Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997) (recognizing the
proper time for evaluating equivalents under the doctrine of equivalents is at the time of
infringement, not at the time the patent was issued).
97Al-Site Corp., 424 F.3d at 1320 (holding the proper time for recognizing equivalents is at the
time the patent was issued, not when it was infringed); Frank's Casing Crew, 389 F.3d at 1379.
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functional claim writing. Part II (A) addresses the conflicting standards of review
used by the Federal Circuit interpreting Paragraph 6 claims. Part 11 (B) discusses
the Federal Circuit's use of the after-developed technology doctrine to limit a
functional claim's scope and elucidates the disparity between the doctrine of
equivalents and the equivalents clause of Paragraph 6. Part II (C) criticizes the
Federal Circuit's conflicting expressions of congressional intent.

A. Breakingthe Promise ofMarkman
The Federal Circuit was presented with three opportunities to clarify whether
application of the equivalents clause to a functional claim was a factual or legal issue
and in each instance the Federal Circuit declined to provide a framework for teasing
out these issues. In In re Donaldsonthe court held, contrary to established precedent
and legislative history, 98 that it had the authority to decide both validity and
infringement issues under Paragraph 6, despite only being presented with an appeal
of the PTO's claim construction. 99 After making such a bold pronouncement, the
court failed to provide guidelines to carefully tease out factual (infringement) and
legal (patentability or validity) issues. Courts and litigants were left to ponder
whether equivalents could be decided by a judge at the summary judgment stage, or
if doing so abrogated a litigant's Seventh Amendment rights.
In Markman, the Federal Circuit, rather than clarify the issue, chose to relegate
its analysis to a footnote. 100 The Supreme Court, affirming the Federal Circuit's
ruling, clearly indicated that factual and legal inquiries should be separated but also
chose not to directly address the Seventh Amendment's impact on functional
claims. 101

In Chiuminatta, the Federal Circuit explicitly maintained that it would not
decide whether infringement under Paragraph 6 was an issue of fact or law10 2 and
then proceeded, as a matter of claim construction, to enter summary judgment of
non-infringement, sua sponte.10 3 This holding has, for all intents and purposes,

98ADELMAN, supra note 10, § 2.9[5] n.58 (criticizing In re Donaldson as contrary to
Congressional intent).
9 In ro Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The issue before the court was clearly
one of claim construction only and thus, despite lacking the record to decide whether the equivalents
clause was part of the infringement analysis, the court reached beyond the record to decide the
issue. Id. at 1192.
100 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517
U.S. 370 (1996) ("[W]e express no opinion on the issue of whether a determination of equivalents
under § 112, para. 6 is a question of law or fact."). The claims at issue in Markman were not
functional and therefore the court exercised judicial restraints, deciding it was inappropriate to
decide an issue it was not squarely presented with. Id.
101 Markman, 517 U.S. at 384.
102 Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (leaving open the issue of "whether a determination of equivalents under § 112, para. 6 is a
question of law or fact").
103 Id. at 1311. This holding made a procedural leap from reserving judgment on the issue of
whether the equivalents clause is for courts or juries to entering summary judgment of noninfringement as a matter of law because the specifications did not list the accused pre-existing
technology. Id. at 1310-11.
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made infringement of unlisted previously developed technologies a legal issue. 104
The propriety of this approach has been subject to debate, even within the Federal
1 05
Circuit, with compelling policy and constitutional arguments on both sides.
Judge Rader himself has, on several occasions, pointed out the folly in deciding
infringement on summary judgment, criticizing the court for conducting de novo
review of factual issues that should be reviewed under the more deferential clearly
erroneous standard. 106
The Federal Circuit's approach arguably confuses
infringement with patentability issues, 107 thus allowing judges to use the equivalents
clause to simultaneously decide claim construction and infringement as a matter of
law. 108 This framework engenders ambiguity over a litigant's constitutional right to
a jury apropos the equivalents clause. 109
101Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The court clarified that
pre-existing technologies, if unlisted in the specifications, can't literally infringe a functional
element because "under § 112 [the equivalent] must have been available at the time of the issuance
of the claim." Id. The court did recognize, however, that after-arising technology should be analyzed
under the usual doctrine of equivalents analysis, noting that "under the doctrine of equivalents" a
Paragraph 6 equivalent "may arise after patent issuance and before the time of infringement." Id.
105 See, e.g., Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1015 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(noting the conflicting views of the Judges on the Federal Circuit regarding the proper application of
the equivalents clause). Cf Cross Med. Prod., Inc. v. Medtronie Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293,
1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The patent described "securing means" and listed only an "external nut"
while the accused device employed a "set screw." Id. at 1306-07. The court reversed a finding of
infringement but stated the equivalence of a "set screw" to an "external nut" created an issue of fact
for the jury, precluding a finding of infringement as a matter of law. Id. at 1317. Thus leaving the
question for the jury on remand, rather than stating that, as a matter of law, the unlisted
technology could not be equivalent. Id.
106 Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp, 102 F.3d 524, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Rader, J., dissenting)
(reminding the court "because the district court did not address any structural equivalents under 35
U.S.C. § 112, 6 genuine issues of material fact remain" thus indicating that infringement (whether
an accused element is an equivalent of a functional claim) is an issue of fact); see also Loral
Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, Ltd., 906 F. Supp. 798, 808 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Sitting as a
district court judge by designation, Judge Rader indicated "the final inquiry as to whether an
accused element is 'an equivalent thereof is a question of fact."); Overhead Door Corp. v.
Chamberlain Group, Inc., 194 F.3d 1261, 1266, 1269-70 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Citing to both
Chiuminatta and Sag, Judge Rader, construing a functional claim, notes summary judgment
should only be granted where "no reasonable fact-finder could find equivalence" and makes no
mention of the after-developed technology doctrine).
107 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
108 Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 183 (recognizing that the Federal Circuit itself has conflicting
rulings on the issue). There are several cases holding equivalency of functional elements is a matter
of fact. Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 975 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Whether [the] accused device is
a § 112 equivalent of the described embodiment is a question of fact."); D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co.,
755 F.2d 1570, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (recognizing '[b]ecause infringement is itself an issue of
fact ... it should be approached with [some] care" the court held summary judgment for the
defendant in an infringement suit where the claims fell under Paragraph 6 was impermissible);
Overhead Door, 194 F.3d at 1266, 1269-70. The contrary view has since been expressed, in some
cases limiting or abrogating the Palumhds categorical rule. Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1995), a£fd,517 U.S. 370 (1996); Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc.,
939 F.2d 1533, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1308, 1311; AlSite Corp., 174 F.3d
at 1321 n.2 (suggesting equivalence of unlisted preexisting technologies may be decided as an issue
of fact); Bateman v. Por-ta Target, Inc., 155 F. App'x 511, 514, 516-17 (Fed. Cir. 2005). For meansplus-function limitations, the doctrine of equivalents reduces to whether or not there is an
"insubstantial difference" between the limitation's corresponding structure and any after-invented
technology found in the accused device. Where, as here, the equivalence issue does not involve later-

[7:218 2007]

The Crossroads of Patentability & Validity

1. CompetingPerspeetives:Equivalents Clause as an Issue ofFact or Law
Everyone agrees functional claims are too broad and if left unchecked would
forestall innovation. From this standpoint, Chiuminatta'safter-developed technology
doctrine is simply the current framework for constricting functional claims. 110
Because means and step-plus-function claims are, by their very nature, vague,
adopting a rule permitting judges to decide infringement as a matter of law would
better serve the patent's public notice function, thereby advancing uniformity in the
patent system.1 11 Deciding infringement as an issue of law also decreases the burden
on the federal courts, enabling judges to decide more cases on summary judgment,
thereby dispensing large case loads and increasing efficiency in the federal docket.
Also, given Chiuminatta's after-developed technology doctrine, should the patentee
fail to list the accused "means" in his specification, the defendant could not infringe
11 2
as a matter of law and the jury, therefore, is properly removed from the equation.
Finally, the equivalents clause is another arrow in the quiver for those advocating for
113
a specialized patent court system which eliminates juries altogether.
Opponents of the current trend toward making infringement an issue of law
point to a myriad of procedural complications which generally concentrate on the
inherent unfairness of the existing approach.1 1 4 First, should the Federal Circuit
definitively hold infringement under the equivalents clause is a matter of law,
developed technologies, "a finding of non-equivalence ... preclude[s] a contrary finding under the
doctrine of equivalents." Id. (internal citations omitted).
109 Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 183. Commentators note that the Federal Circuit or Supreme
Court must definitively pass on the issue of whether or not the equivalents clause of Paragraph 6 is
an issue of fact or law. David R. Todd, How Modern Treatment of 35 USC. §112(6) has Caused
Confusion: Hilton Davis v. Warner-Jenkinson and the Right to a Jury on the Issue of Patent
Infringement Under the 'Equitable"Doctrine ofEquivalents, 1996 BYU L. REV. 141, 179-80 (1996);
see generallyCasey, supra note 39, at 844.
110 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997).
111 Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1946). Judges' consistent
interpretation of claims is crucial to our intellectual property regime. Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc. 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (noting that patent disclosures serve an important public
notice function, informing licensee and competitors of the scope of invention that has been occupied).
The Federal Circuit has aptly pointed out the need for clear notice is greater with means-plusfunction claims since the functional claim language alone does not define the invention's scope for
competitors. Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms, Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Michel, J.,
additional views).
112 Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Weatherford Int'l Inc., 389 F.3d 1370, 1378-79

(Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting the court compares "the accused structure with the disclosed structur'
emphasizing that the disclosed structure is the only way to narrow overly broad functional claims
and therefore unlisted technologies can not infringe as a matter of law); Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l,
Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1321 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
113 John B. Pegram, Should There Be a US. Trial Court with a Specialization in Patent
Litigation 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 766, 769-70 (2000). Every patent trial is a
complicated mixed bag of questions of law and fact and means and step-plus-function claims are
certainly no exception. Cheryl Lee Johnson, The Continuing Inability of Judges to Pass their
Markman Tests: Why the Expanding Murkiness of the Task Leaves No Judge Behind, in HOW TO
PREPARE & CONDUCT MREMLAN HEARINGS 2007 675 nn.45, 139 (PLI Pats., Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Ser., PLI Order No. 11581), availableatWL, 907
PLI/Patent 675 (discussing the Federal Circuit's opinion in Cybor adopting de novo review of claims
construction).
114 Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 183-84.
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opponents argue such a rule would violate their Seventh Amendment right to a jury
under Markman.115 The Federal Circuit's current formulation, which presumes an
"intent to evoke" Paragraph 6, also seems somewhat at odds with the presumption of
validity that patents enjoy. 116 If issued patents are presumed valid, allowing the
accused infringer to shift the burden onto the patentee simply by pointing to
allegedly functional claim language seems unfair, especially if the patentee never
could have known his issued patent contained functional language (e.g. where her
claims lack "means for X"). During claim construction, the presumption of validity
should require more from accused infringers. 117 Finally, judges, after construing a
claim in means or step-plus-function, are more inclined to grant summary judgment
to accused infringers, i.e. to find the patent's narrow claims could not be infringed as
11
a matter of law. 8

B. The After-Developed Technology Doctrine."Using the Equivalents Clause
to Punish FunctionalClaim Writing
For practitioners, the stigma attached to Paragraph 6 is not confined to any
perceived unfairness or confusion regarding the appropriate standard of review. At a
much more basic level, patentees and practitioners are reticent to evoke Paragraph 6
because of the implications such a decision will have on a patent's scope.
Furthermore, practitioners are uneasy about employing functional claims due to
exhortations from Chiuminattaand several other Federal Circuit opinions where the
court suggests its general disapproval of means and step-plus-function claims.1 1 9
Some opinions even border on paternalism, punishing functional claims for
120
overreaching.
115 Supra note 106 and accompanying text; Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448,
1473-75 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Federal Circuit's de novo review of
claim construction and noting the adverse impact on litigant's Seventh Amendment jury rights after
Markman).
116 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006); see also FED. R. EVID. 301 (stating the party against whom the
presumption operates carries the burden of providing evidence to rebut or meet the presumption);
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (recognizing the long held
standard that the litigant seeking to have a patent declared invalid bears the burden of showing
invalidity by clear and convincing evidence).
117 SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Eng'g, Inc., 465 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that patent's
enjoy a presumption of validity and requiring the summary judgment movant to show clear and
convincing evidence of invalidity, e.g. that no reasonable juror could find otherwise).
I18 See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1475 (Rader, J., dissenting).
11) Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310-11 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (Chastising patentee for not including known technology in his specifications, the court
remarked "no policy based reason why a patentee should get two bites at the apple.").
120 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co.,
Inc., 115 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (recognizing a
patentee's right to invoke Paragraph 6, and harshly criticizing employing step-plus-function claims).
The price that must be paid for use of that convenience is limitation of the claim to the means
specified in the written description and equivalents thereof. Id. Similarly, a step for accomplishing
a particular function in a process claim may also be claimed without specificity subject to the same
price. Id.; Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Tech. Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 948 n.i, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Kahn
v. GM Corp., 135 F.3d 1472, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The duty to link or associate structure in the
specification with the function is the quidpro quo for the convenience of employing [functional claim
elements]."); Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting
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The after-developed technology doctrine obviously limits a functional claim's
scope but it also makes it incredibly easy for competitors to design around functional
claims. A competitor, reading the publicly available functional claim, may simply use
different structures, materials or acts to achieve the same function and avoid
infringement provided that technology was known to the patentee and went
undisclosed in her application. 121 Thus, a competitor could also avoid infringement
122
by simply employing different structure to achieve an identical purpose.
Proponents of the after-developed technology doctrine argue that it better serves a
patent's public notice function because it forces functional claim writers to be much
more explicit in the specification, narrowing their vague claims.

123

Still, opponents contend such devastating results were never intended by
Congress's understanding of the equivalents clause. 124 Furthermore, it seems the
after-developed technology doctrine is fundamentally at odds with the intent-based
approach developed by Judge Rader. It is simply non-pragmatic to suggest that a
patentee would ever intend to evoke Paragraph 6 given the ramifications it would
have on the scope of his patent. Judge Rader's intent-based approach could have
halted the Federal Circuit's amorphous framework and provided the district courts
with procedural guidance when adjudicating means-plus-function claims. 125 Had the
Federal Circuit adopted this test, the district courts would be easily guided through
litigation. The absence or presence of certain language would give rise to the
presumption of means-plus-function treatment which could be rebutted. The specific
talismanic language would grow slowly over time and provide notice to practitioners
and patentees that specific language would trigger Paragraph 6. However, this did
not happen and instead, the standard for what constitutes "functional" language

functional claiming comes with "string[s] attached"); Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Co., 185 F.3d
1259, 1266-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999). This paternal approach of chastising the patentee for employing
functional claim language has taken hold in district courts. See, e.g., Safran v. Boston Scientific
Corp., No. 2-05-CV-547 (TJW), 2007 WL 2901166, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2007); Sokolov v. Lorad
Corp., 476 F. Supp. 2d 130, 134 (D. Conn. 2007); Trading Tech. Int'l, Inc. v. eSpeed Inc., Nos. 04 C
5312, 05 C 1079, 05 C 4088, 05 C 4120, 05 C 4811, 05 C 5164, 2006 WL 3147697, at *11 (N.D.111.
Oct. 31, 2006).
121 Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2005). The replicating device might avoid infringement by adding a well known (old) technology to
the patentee's device. Id. For example, suppose the patentee claims "a means for opening and
closing a three ring binder" and the accused infringing binder employs two clips at the proximal and
distal ends. If the patentee failed to list the clips in his specifications, the accused device would not
infringe. There are cases suggesting, however, that making insubstantial changes, e.g. changing a
nail to a screw where the patentee only disclosed a nail in the specifications, would still infringe
functional claims. Id. Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Of course, in either case, while the accused device might avoid infringement, it is doubtful it would
be patentable in itself. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
122 Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Co., 185 F.3d 1259, 1266-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating meansplus-function limitations, unlike non-functional patent claims, must have functional identity with
an accused infringer's claim).
123 See sup-ra note 111 and accompanying text. But see In re Fuetterer, 319 F.2d 259, 264
(C.C.P.A. 1963) (holding the plaintiffs combination patentable despite the lack of such an
exhaustive list).
124 Todd, supra note 109, at 179; Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 173-74.
125 Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1427-28 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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remains ambiguous. 126 The intent-based formula, when combined with the afterdeveloped technology doctrine, is simply not in step with reality.

C. CongressionalIntent Under the FederalCircuit
Throughout the turbulent history of Paragraph 6, courts and academics have
offered conflicting expressions of congressional intent. The congressional record is
silent on whether the equivalents clause should be applied during facial challenges or
infringement. 127 However, considering where Paragraph 6 appears within the
Patent Act itself suggests, as a matter of statutory construction, Congress intended it
to only affect patentability determinations. 128
Furthermore, the holding of
Halliburton, which Paragraph 6 statutorily overruled, was merely a decision of
patent invalidity, not infringement. 129 Therefore, had Congress also intended for this
clause to resolve more than facial challenges during litigation, they could have more
explicitly said so. Thus an argument could be made that Paragraph 6 was enacted
simply to make functional claims patentable and the court's analysis, during
litigation, should begin and end with a determination of validity. 130 Recalibrating
the framework in this way casts even further doubt on Chiuminatta; given the effect
that ruling has on a patent's scope, it does not appear Congress, in permitting the
use of functional claims, meant to create a lower class of patents subject to less
protection. 131 Therefore, if we treat functional claims like all others, infringement of
126 Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding a
claim lacking the term "means" does give rise to a presumption that Paragraph 6 does not apply and
recognizing the word "mechanism" alone was enough to evoke Paragraph 6 treatment because the
generic term appeared in a claim that did not recite "sufficiently definite structure"); Greenberg v.
Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp.,
724 F.2d 951, 957 (Fed. Cir. 1983) and suggesting that a means-plus-function claim may exist
without the "means for" trigger and providing "so that" as an example).
127 Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 165-66; Lee & Paige, supra note 14, at 254-55.
128 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6 (2006) (appearing in the chapter on "Application for Patent" and the
subsection dealing with patentability and disclosures, which are generally part of a validity or
patentability analysis, not infringement). So gcnnrally 73 AM. JUR. 2D § 108 (2007); ADELMAN,
supra note 10, § 2.9[5] n.62 (criticizing In re Donaldson as inimical of Commissioner Federico's
commentary and stating Paragraph 6's clear language ("to cover") meant the clause should be used
for infringement only). But see United States v. Jac Natori Co., Ltd., 108 F.3d 295, 299 (Fed. Cir.
1997) ("[T]itles of statutes are simply reference guides and cannot limit or contravene the statutory
text.").
129 Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 2 (1946). While the district court
found the patent "valid and infringed" the only issue on appeal was the validity of respondent's
claims. Id. at 8.
130 See, e.g., CardiacPacemakers _T296 F.3d 1106, 1113-14 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding a meansplus-function claim invalid due to indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
2). If Congress only
intended Paragraph 6 be used as a tool during validity determinations, Cardiac Pacemakers I
provides an excellent example of what the simplified analysis might look like in every case involving
functional claims: the court briefly reviewing the corresponding specifications to determine if the
required disclosures are met. Id.
131 The Patent Act of 1952: Hearing Before Submeomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary 82nd Cong. 62 (1952) (statement of Cecil C. Kent). The only testimony found in the
Congressional Record which extensively speaks directly to functional claiming under 35 U.S.C. §
112, 3 (1952) was that of Cecil C. Kent where he suggests (1) functional claiming is preferred to all
other types of claim language because it allows the inventor to better define his invention and (2)
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functional claims, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, would be an
issue of fact.132 If this is true, much of the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence would
violate the patentee's Seventh Amendment rights. However, applying Paragraph 6
133
or commentators. 134
to facial challenges only has not gained traction with courts
Instead, the debate over congressional intent focuses on In re Donaldson and the
struggle between the PTO's long-standing practice and the Federal Circuit's groundbreaking approach.
The Federal Circuit's hybrid approach from In re Donaldson is generally viewed
as the source of ambiguity regarding whether infringement under the equivalents
clause should be made by juries or judges 135 and the confusion surrounding the
proper application of the equivalents clause. 136 In In re Donaldson, the court
explicitly overruled In re Lundberg,137 where the Federal Circuit's predecessor court
138
held the specifications should not bear on a functional claim's patentability.
Furthermore, both the Supreme Court, in Warner-Jenkinson,and the Federal Circuit
139
have cited to Federico's commentary on the New Patent Act for legislative intent.
However, the Federal Circuit's reliance on his commentary seems somewhat
disingenuous given their holding in Donaldson where the court states Federico's
commentary, which speaks directly on how the equivalents clause should be applied,
was not authoritative. 140 Finally, the court, rather than defer to the PTO's practice
the new paragraph should be used to help define claims, leading one to believe he believed the new
act would only be allowed in patentability decision, though he never expressly states a view either
way. Id. at 71-73.
132 Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Frank's Casing Crew & Rental
Tools, Inc. v. Weatherford Int'l Inc., 389 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
':3:3Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997) ("'[E]quivalents'
appears to be no more than a prophylactic against potential side effects of [functional claiming]"e.g., overbreadth, which is part of the infringement analysis).
IM3See, e.g., ADELMAN, supra note 10, § 2.9[5] n.65 ("However, Congress did not choose the
word 'mean.' Instead it used the word 'cover.' Cover is a word commonly used in the patent
profession to describe infringing acts."); Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 165-66 (noting that only the
first clause of Paragraph 6 was necessary to overrule Halliburton and thus the inclusion of the
equivalents clause must have been intended to provide an infringement test); Todd, supra note 109,
179 ("§ 112, 6 is the doctrine of equivalents codified for functional language.").
135 See Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 182 (noting the conflicting standards of review applied to
decisions under the equivalents clause and ultimately endorsing an infringement only approach);
Casey, supra note 39, at 865 (endorsing Markman but noting the host of unresolved issues in
deciding infringement under the equivalents clause).
136 In
-re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding Paragraph 6 should be
applied to both patentability and validity decisions, before courts or the PTO, and infringement).
' 7 244 F.2d 543 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
138 Id. at 547-48 (holding the claims must distinctly point out the claimed subject matter and
the specifications may not be used to "impart patentability to an otherwise unpatentable claim").
1:39WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27-28 (1997) (citing to Mr.
Federico's commentary and stating Paragraph 6 is "an application of the doctrine of equivalents in a
restrictive role"). It would thus appear the Supreme Court, in dicta, expressed its willingness to
overrule In re Donaldson. Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 164.
140 In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1194 n.3 (stating Congress, despite having the PTO's examiner
in chief present during committee proceedings, was not aware of the PTO's sweeping practice of not
using the specifications to interpret claims and relegating Federico's commentary on the equivalents
clause to a footnote and calling them his mere "personal views"). ContraFederico, supra note 23, at
187 ("[The equivalents clause] relates primarily to the construction of such claims for the purposes
of determining when the claim is infringed (note the use of the word 'cover' [in the statute]) and
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of not using Paragraph 6 to determine patentability, mandated the PTO begin
applying the statute to functional claims. 141

Examining pre-Halliburton case law sheds further light on the penumbra
surrounding the statute. 142 In re Lundberg and other early cases suggest functional
equivalents was the second part of a two-step analysis during which (1) patentability
was decided by the claim language alone, without reference to the specifications and
(2) infringement was determined by looking to the written descriptions. 143 Therefore,
if Congress, as the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit suggest, was merely restoring
pre-Halliburton understandings of functional claiming, then they must have
intended the equivalents clause to be used only for infringement decisions.144
In
other words, when Congress chose to sanction these claims, it was fully aware of
Supreme Court precedent denying the claims due to over-breadth and, one can
assume, sought to constrict the scope of these claims with a separate infringement
145
analysis under the equivalents clause.

III. THREE CONVERGING POLICY CRITIQUES
Seemingly, everything comes down to Congress's understanding of two
rudimentary patent law concepts, patentability and infringement. Ascertaining the
policy Congress sought to advance when sanctioning functional claiming helps bring
these issues into focus, but neither approach completely resolves all the problems
inhering in the current framework. If Congress sought solely to provide guidelines
for determining the patentability of functional claims, then the Federal Circuit's
understanding of means and step-plus-function claims could be subject to serious
criticism: the court's jurisprudence would (1) unjustifiably create a lower class of
patents subject to less protection and higher scrutiny and (2) unfairly impinge on
would not appear to have much, if any, applicability in determining the patentability of such
claims."). See also,ADELMAN supra note 10, § 2.9[5] n.62.
H'11162 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE OFFICIAL GAZZETTE 59 (May 17, 1994) (criticizing the
Federal Circuit's decision in In re Donaldson but recognizing that it mandated a new examining
procedure despite the well known policy the PTO had followed "for at least the last forty-two years").
Deference is paid to an administrative body's interpretation of a statute where that body is charged
with administration of the statute. Chula Vista City School Dist. v. Bennett, 824 F.2d 1573, 157980 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re De Luxe N.V., 990 F.2d 607, 609-10 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (both applying a
deferential standard toward the PTO's statutory interpretation). See also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527
U.S. 150, 160-61 (1999) (noting the deference owed to the PTO when interpreting its own
procedures).
112 Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 173 (arguing that restoring pre-Hallihurton conceptions of
functional patent claims means that the equivalents clause could only be used for infringement
because courts, before 1952, only looked to claims to determine scope of infringement).
"1 Id.
at 166-71; In re Lundberg; 244 F.2d at 548. If this looks familiar, it should, it was
essentially the same distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in Markman to separate legal and
factual issues. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378-83 (1996).
M4Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 170, 194.
145 See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853); Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 9 (1946); Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d
1580, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See also Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) ("We
assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation."); Mills Music, Inc. v.
Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 170 (1985) (presuming Congress, when enacting statutes, is aware of the state
of the law and the industries "vitally affected" by its legislation).
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litigant's Seventh Amendment rights. 146 Despite cogent arguments supporting this
approach, this framework has not been well received and instead the debate rages
147
between the Federal Circuit and academics.
Academics argue Federico's commentary makes clear Paragraph 6 was only
intended "to cover" infringing materials, structures or acts found in the
specification.148 While an "infringement only" approach narrows the scope of these
broad claims, it does nothing to help determine their patentability. Presumably,
adopting such a reading of Congress's intent would return the courts and the PTO to
pre-In re Donaldson claim construction, forcing patentees to distinctly claim their
invention without reference to the specifications. 149 However, practitioners and
lower courts are provided no guidance regarding what language triggers the statute.
The Federal Circuit's hybrid approach of applying Paragraph 6 to patentability,
validity, and infringement determinations feigns fidelity to Congress's dual intent
behind the statute.
Separating Paragraph 6 into two separate clauses,
150
simultaneously sanctions functional claiming while restricting its over-breadth.
However, this analytic framework, as applied by the Federal Circuit, has many
faults. First, Federico's commentary, the best source of Congress's intent behind the
1952 Patent Act, suggests a discordant theory. 151 Second, this approach fails to
distinguish patentability from infringement analysis, causing (a) confusion over the
appropriate standard of appellate review 152 that has (b) led to a silent, yet salient
153
rejection of Markman's bifurcated analysis with respect to functional claims,

allowing (c) federal judges to routinely decide factual issues, such as infringement, on
summary judgment, abrogating a litigant's Seventh Amendment rights. 154 This
single paragraph should not be interpreted to lead to procedurally inapposite
propositions.
The Federal Circuit's trigger 155 for evoking the statute is also flawed. 156 Judge
Rader's modified "intent to evoke" test, as currently applied is (1) non-pragmatic, (2)

See supra section IH(C).
See supra notes 133 & 134 and accompanying text.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
19 35 U.S.C. § 112,
2 (2006). The approach of denying functional claims under Paragraph 2
116

147
148

is part of the Federal Circuit's post-In re Donaldsonapproach; if the court reversed In re Donaldson,

it would presumably employ only this first step of the analysis, holding functional claims invalid if
they failed to set out "corresponding function" in the specifications. See generallyBiomedino, LLC
v. Waters Tech., Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (indicating a failure to disclose the
claimed function in the specifications is a failure to "particularly point out and distinctly claim the
invention as required by the second paragraph of § 112"); Cardiac Pacemakers , 296 F.3d 1106,
1114-15 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (using the first clause of Paragraph 6 to determine claim validity where the
patentee failed to list any structure in the specifications corresponding to the means-plus-function
claim).
150 See, e.g., Biomedino, 490 F.3d at 953 (holding functional claim invalid under Paragraph 2);
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27-28 (1996) (recognizing the
equivalents clause is a "prophylactic" for narrowing the scope of the claim).
151 See supra notes 23 & 139-140 and accompanying text.
152 Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 190, 193-94.
See supra notes 78, 106-109 and accompanying text.
See supra Section H (A).
155 See supra Section I (B).
156 See supra Section 11 (B).
153
154
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157
inefficient and (3) unfair given the limited scope of protection afforded such claims.

Rather than maintain a bright-line rule, the Federal Circuit instead relegated Judge
Rader's formula from Sage to a small component of the overall muddled means-plusfunction analysis, which leaves litigants scratching their heads as to precisely what
language evokes the statute. 158 Under the modernized intent-based formula, the
patentee may evoke the statute without ever knowing it, upsetting her investmentbacked expectations in the monopoly granted to her. 159 Intent requires knowledge of
actions that will produce a desired result. The absence of a clear bright-line formula
makes speaking of an "intent to evoke" the statute absurd and impractical, especially
given the devastating consequences Chiuminatta can have on a functional patent's
scope. 160 From a practitioner's standpoint, intendingto evoke Paragraph 6 may even
be prima facie grounds for a malpractice suit, considering the limiting protection
afforded such claims.
This test also inefficiently expands the appellate docket.
Without clear
boundaries as to what constitutes "functional" language evoking the statute, litigants
have every incentive, under de novo review of claim construction, to appeal the final
judgment. An amorphous "intent to evoke" standard, combined with de novo review,
virtually guarantees every means-plus-function claim will be appealed to the Federal
Circuit, regardless of the outcome.
Finally, The Federal Circuit's synthesis punishes patentees by limiting the scope
of such patents.161 These deliberate impediments have resulted in a cessation of
functional claim language, causing more and more accused infringers to frequently
summon Paragraph 6 as an alternate defense to infringement.
The current
framework has transformed Paragraph 6 from a statute permitting functional
claiming to a defense against infringement. But perhaps therein lies the genius of
the Federal Circuit's approach: by restricting the scope of these claims, the court has
made them radioactive, causing practitioners to more carefully draft their claims to
avoid means or step-plus-function treatment. If functional claims were unregulated,
they would undoubtedly cast a very wide net trapping otherwise valid patents and
thereby undermining technological advancements. 162 The past decade, however,
teaches us that the obverse is also true: excessive regulation creates a lower class of
patents entitled to far less protection. It is clear that the Federal Circuit's current
framework goes too far in all directions and must be reined in. However, neither the
patentability nor the infringement-only approach remedies all of the problems
surrounding functional claims.

157

See supra notes 125 & 126 and accompanying text.

158

See supra note 126 and accompanying text.

159 Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
160 Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310-11 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (enunciating the after-developed technology doctrine).
1 1 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
102

See supratext accompanying note 5.
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A. Status Quo
The 110th Congress, which many anticipate will pass patent reform, 163 could
resolve the debate between validity and infringement. Specifically, Congress could
decide the precise application of the equivalents clause in relation to the doctrine of
equivalents and address the soundness of the Federal Circuit's current analytic
framework. 164 This can be accomplished in any of several ways: enacting a provision
similar to Paragraph 6 under the section for infringement, 165 holding hearings and
amending Paragraph 6 (accompanied by advisory findings) or simply repealing
Paragraph 6 altogether.
Adding a subsection in section 271, with language nearly identical to Paragraph
6, would effectively endorse the Federal Circuit's In re Donaldson approach, allowing
courts to use Paragraph 6 for patentability and infringement decisions. However, if
this is done, courts would still be left without a method for teasing out the factual
and legal issues. Additionally, this would still leave patentee's to "pay the price" for
their functional claiming with the after-developed technology doctrine, which, under
Abaeus, many patentees never saw coming. 166
Amending Paragraph 6 would allow Congress to restore some balance between
the constitutional rights and statutory entitlements of patentees and the public
167
interest. By simply adding two words, "infringement of' to the equivalents clause,
Congress can definitively resolve the dispute over functional claiming in favor of
Federico's commentary, restoring the equivalents clause to part of the infringement
analysis only. The appropriate level of appellate scrutiny for this factual inquiry
would be, a fortiori,the deferential clearly erroneous standard, stopping the court's
current trend toward a de novo approach dead in its tracks. Patentability of such
claims would be governed by looking to Paragraph 2 of the statute to determine
whether the corresponding specifications distinctly claim the invention. 168
However, the conflict between validity and infringement is, for all practical
purposes, an academic distinction without a difference. 169 Courts no more discern
the bounds of a functional claim during claim construction than infringement. After
amending the statute, courts would still be left to determine the scope and validity of
the claims in front of them, they would just use Paragraph 2 instead of Paragraph 6
to invalidate them.17 0 Thus, while adding these two words to the statute draws a line
163See Patently-O,
Patent
2007/04/patent reform a.html.

Reform

Act

of

2007,

http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/

See supra Section II.
16535 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).

104

166See supra notes 125 & 126 and accompanying text.
16735 U.S.C. § 112, 6. The proposed equivalents clause would thus read "and infringement of
such a claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, materials or acts described in
the specification and equivalents thereof." Id.
168See supra notes 130 & 149 and accompanying text.
169

See Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 178 (suggesting that applying the equivalents clause at

either the claim construction or infringement analysis will have no bearing on the ultimate outcome
of a particular case).
170 See id. at 192-93 (recognizing In re Donaldson was wrong and endorsing a historical
infringement only test). Of course, while this approach may be sound it does not provide guidance
for district courts to ferret out functional claims, leaving the PTO responsible for narrowing overly
broad means-plus-function claims. Id.
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in the sand separating issues of fact and law, it doesn't make functional claims any
clearer and thus courts would still use the specifications during facial challenges or
infringement. Also, because the equivalents clause would have no bearing on the
patentability of such claims, this would, by default, effectively endorse the afterdeveloped technology doctrine as the only available means of roping in overly broad
functional claims. Thus, adopting the much lauded Federico approach probably will
not change anything in real-world litigation and still leaves several residual
problems: (i) determining what constitutes "functional" language and (2) whether the
inherent unfairness of the after-developed technology doctrine can be justified.

B. Deus Ex Machina: Notiee to the Patentee
Many of the problems and inequities of the current system could be resolved by
simply amending the MPEP. 1 1 I propose the PTO develop an alternative claims
prosecution process for means and step-plus-function claims: the PTO should notify
the patentee of a functional claim and explain that her claim evokes Paragraph 6.172
The PTO should further require the patentee to either concede such treatment or
simply amend and re-write the functional claim as non-functional. Either way, the
patentee has fair notice and concedes a narrower scope of her invention. The
patentee can no longer justifiably complain that means or step-plus-function
treatment will limit the scope of their right or upset their investment backed
expectations when they can easily amend their application to include other
technologies or simply get rid of the functional language altogether. By providing
notice, claim interpretation would be efficiently resolved early in the patent process:
during prosecution history or a Markman hearing, both of which would have
preclusive effect and conserve judicial resources. 173 If the file wrapper clearly shows
the patentee used functional language, the appellate docket will not be consumed by
cases asking whether the patentee evoked the statute. 174

171 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2181 (8th ed., 6th Rev. 2007) [hereinafter MPEP]. Despite the decision in In re
Donaldson, the PTO is free to establish its own procedures and I have proposed a new prosecution
approach for functional claims.
172Id. § 2184. While the guidelines suggest the applicant may amend his application to remove
the functional language, they do not provide a mechanism for providing notice of an examiners
opinion that the claim language evokes the statute. Id.
17'See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem., Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30-32 (discussing file
wrapper estoppel whereby the patentee is precluded from subsequently recapturing concessions
made during patent prosecution with the PTO, unless the patentee can show amendments were
made for reasons unrelated to patentability). Once the patentee is informed of the functional
language, she can either narrow the patent by removing the functional language, stand on the claim
and appeal the examiner's decision or roll the dice and take the claim encumbered by the functional
element. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737-38 (2002);
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) (noting issue preclusion will
foster uniformity of patent construction).
174 Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Additionally, this will increase the patent's presumption of validity since a lack of Paragraph 6
treatment by the PTO would place a higher burden on the accused infringer to show the language is
functional. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). Of course, there will still be instances where the PTO failed to
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Finally, from a business and practitioner standpoint, adopting Judge Rader's
bright-line rule would provide the inventive community with much needed guidance
on what constitutes a "functional" claim. Congress should statutorily adopt a brightline test and endeavor to create an exhaustive list of functional terms. There will no
doubt be exceptions to any exhaustive list, but this will provide a better baseline for
avoiding functional claims, which, under the current system, must be constrained to
the technologies listed in the specifications and after-developed technologies.
Congress could statutorily overrule Chiuminatta but in doing so it would have to
provide an alternative method for narrowing functional claims broad scope. At any
rate, doing so is unnecessary should an alternative claims prosecution process. With
notice from the PTO, practitioners could either remove functional terms or provide
exhaustive lists of technologies in their specifications.

CLOSING REMARKS

Functional claiming addresses the heart of our IP regime: what do we, as a
society, recognize as the inventive moment and how much protection do we award for
disclosing new art? If we view invention as a mere recombination of known
elements,1 7 5 then functional claims should enjoy the same protection as all other
claims and perhaps we shouldn't restrict their scope at all.17 6 While this view has
been rejected and conventional analysis restricts the scope of functional claims, it is
important to remember that the PTO, despite the functional language, decided to
grant a patent. Given the appellate procedure within the PTO and their guidelines
for examining means and step-plus-function claims, every granted patent should
enjoy the same presumption of validity other non-functional patents enjoy, even if we
must, out of necessity, restrict their scope.177 In re Donaldson was wrong because it
contradicted both long standing precedent and Federico's commentary, laying the
foundation for the Federal Circuit to sit as a supra-examining board and treat
functional claims as second class patents.
While Congress clearly acknowledged that functional claims suffer over-breadth
problems, they nevertheless authorized their use and codified pre-Halliburton
conceptions of such claims. Rather than let these claims evolve, the Federal Circuit
has stifled their use and employed the equivalents clause to narrow claims the
patentee could not have reasonably perceived as evoking the statute.1 7 8 While it may
be necessary to narrow broad claims, the current system has many unnecessary
problems. Many of these inconsistencies can be resolved, thereby saving the current
apply Paragraph 6 and notify the patentee of such treatment, but these cases will be far fewer than
the amount of means-plus-function cases currently on the Federal Circuit's docket.
175 The Patent Act of 1952: Hearing Before Submeomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary,82nd Cong. 58, 62 (1952) (statement of Cecil C. Kent) ("Scientifically speaking we do not
'invent.' We can only reorganize known structures and thereby produce new relations.").
176 Id. at 70 (expressing his opinion that then 35 U.S.C. § 112,
3 addressed the essence of
what we, as a society, regard as the invention); See also Costakos & Zimmerman, supra note 52, at
111 (noting in the first decade under the Federal Circuit functional, claims enjoyed very broad
protection).
177

35 U.S.C. § 282.

178

See supraPart 11 (B).
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system of narrowing broad functional claims, if Congress and the PTO wills it. 179
However, if Congress or the PTO do not amend the statute or claim prosecution
process or both, the Supreme Court should not allow Chiuminatta, In re Donaldson
and Abacus to fester and should overrule them and their progeny. Otherwise, they
may establish an insurmountable body of case law establishing the Federal Circuit as
a paternal supra-examining board, abrogating litigant's Seventh Amendment rights
and providing the inventive community with little guidance on what a "functional"
means or step-plus-function claim looks like. However, if the status quo persists,
then patentees will be better off without Paragraph 6 altogether and Congress should
repeal it.18O Patentees and practitioners would much rather have functional claims
rejected for obviousness or over-breadth than spend hundreds of thousands of dollars
and years on futile litigation resulting in patent claims so choked off they provide
virtually no protection.

179Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310-11 (Fed.
Cir. 1998). Chiuminatta's after-developed technology doctrine is a good method for narrowing
claims, it's just been encumbered by unnecessary problems. If these problems are addressed in the
statute or MPEP, then the doctrine can serve its vital role. Otherwise, an alternative mechanism
for narrowing functional claims will have to be adopted.
180Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 194 (concluding that the Federal Circuit misconstrued 35 U.S.C.
§ 112,
6 such that the only way to restore certainty and flexibility to such claims is to strike out
the paragraph altogether). Many critics have suggested simply repealing 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6
altogether or removing the language creating step-plus-function claims. DURHAM, supra note 1, at
65 (suggesting the step-plus-function language should be removed).

